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Why Quarks Are Unobservable
Tobias Fox
Vienna, Austria
Résumé : Cet article pose la question de savoir si les quarks — constituants
élémentaires de la matière et dernières particules de la physique des hautes
énergies à avoir été confirmées — peuvent être observés de manière directe ou
indirecte. D’abord, des définitions antérieures de « l’observation » en physique
seront examinées — en l’occurrence, celles proposées par Grover Maxwell, Bas
van Fraassen et Dudley Shapere. Puis, leurs résultats seront comparés à une
définition du concept d’observation et à une différenciation entre l’observation
directe et indirecte.
Une possibilité de mettre en évidence les quarks de manière expérimen-
tale est le phénomène des jet-events, qui représentent un type spécifique de
désagrégation dans les détecteurs de particules. Ces jet-events contribuent à
l’étude de cas ici centrale, puisqu’ils sont la preuve la plus convaincante à
ce jour des quarks. L’examen de jet-events et leurs évaluations par des phy-
siciens mènent à la conclusion que les quarks ne peuvent être observés, ni
directement ni indirectement. Cette thèse sera comparée aux points de vue de
Kristin Shrader-Frechette et Michela Massimi sur l’observabilité des quarks.
On en tire la conclusion que les quarks ne sont pas observables, si l’on en-
tend employer le terme « observation » dans un sens non métaphorique et en
conservant une relation avec ses usages dans la vie quotidienne.
Abstract: This essay deals with the question whether quarks—the basic com-
ponents of matter and one of the youngest confirmed particles in high energy
physics—can be observed directly or indirectly. First, I shall discuss earlier
definitions of “observation” in physics suggested by Grover Maxwell, Bas van
Fraassen, and Dudely Shapere. Then, I shall compare their results with a
new consideration of the idea of “observation” in physics and the distinction
between direct and indirect observation.
One of the ways that quarks appear in experimental evidence is in jet-
events which are special decay patterns in particle detectors. These jet-events
are the central case study for this essay since they are the most convincing
evidence of quarks so far. My inquiry into the physics behind jet-events and
their treatment by physicists leads me to conclude that quarks are neither
directly nor indirectly observed. I compare this thesis to other views on the
observability of quarks, suggested by Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Michela
Massimi. But in short, it seems to me that if the notion “observation” is to
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have a reasonable relation to an everyday life’s concept of observation, and if
it is meant literally instead of metaphorically, then quarks are not observable
in any currently-known experimental context.
1 Introduction
Observation and observability are key concepts when philosophy of science and
epistemology meet. Philosophy cannot predict which objects might be observ-
able and which are not. It has to define “observability” as an epistemological
term used to give meaning to scientists’ sentences when they claim to have
observed something.
In this paper, I shall discuss the observability of a special kind of elemen-
tary particle—quarks. Today, it is common in physics to deal with entities
that are barely observable, entities which are in principle only indirectly ob-
servable or unobservable. Now, with quarks, because of some physical aspects,
it is not quite clear whether they are observable or not, even though they are
fully-established in theory and sufficient experimental evidence of them exists.
This has provoked some comments in philosophy of science, mainly by Kristin
Shrader-Frechette and Michela Massimi. They came to the conclusion that
quarks are—even directly—observable. Their argument is based on seminal
works on the concept of observability by Grover Maxwell, Bas van Fraassen,
and Dudley Shapere. My approach to this debate has two directions. First,
to search for metaphors used by scientists to describe their findings in quark
physics. And to address whether quarks can be seen or only “seen” in a cer-
tain experimental context. It is logical that if they could only be “seen”—and
this is my presupposition—then quarks are only “observable”, i.e., metaphor-
ically observable but not literally observable. Something only metaphorically
observable could be anything from an entity that is directly observable in an-
other context to unobservable in principle. The idea, that a physical entity is
only “observable”, leads us to question its real relation to the epistemological
concept of observability.
Second, I would like to focus on the exact role jet-events play in experi-
mental particle physics. I will show in detail what jet-events are, and what
their unique decay pattern in particle detectors looks like. However, my work-
ing hypothesis is that jet-events should not to be used as simple images to
predict what might go on at a microphysical scale. The explanatory power
of such events is more subtle, particularly when considering their relevance to
the alleged observation of quarks. My general conclusion is that quarks are
neither directly nor indirectly observable. This conclusion is not based on any
genuine physical statement or theory in particle physics, but it might have
consequence for the ongoing philosophical debate of scientific realism, partic-
ularly as the real classification of entities like quarks becomes more difficult
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when they cannot literally be observed or indirectly observed. Though, this
final thought is not addressed in this paper.
So my chief statement is that quarks are not observable. To come to
this conclusion I will try to develop, in the following Section 2, a concept of
observation and draw a distinction between direct and indirect observation.
Anything that is able to fulfil the criteria of direct or indirect observation
has to be called directly or indirectly observable—regardless of whether this
actually has been done or not. In Section 3, I will give an introduction to
jet-events that occur in certain conditions when highly accelerated particles
collide inside particle detectors. Then I shall apply the concept of observation
to jet-events (Section 4). In this context at least, quarks are not observed in
jet-events, and thus, we have strong indications to believe that they will not
be observed under any other experimental conditions either.
2 What is observation of objects in physics?
2.1 Earlier proposals
The challenge to define “observation” has a lengthy history in philosophy. It is
also a common subject in the philosophy of science and has particular relevance
to the debate on scientific realism. I would like to focus on the meaning of
observation in relation to physical objects. The most famous thoughts on this
subject came from Grover Maxwell, Bas van Fraassen, and Dudley Shapere.
And these authors are repeatedly quoted by later philosophers writing on
quarks. Maxwell argues for the broadest possible concept of observation in
a 1962-paper The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities [Maxwell 1962].
In this work, Maxwell calls some objects theoretical while we would describe
them as physically motivated and call them sometimes indirectly observable.
He is not interested in a distinction between direct and indirect observation,
but in a distinction between observability and unobservability, or, in his terms,
between observation and theory. His inquiry looks at microbes, molecules, and
elementary particles. These are objects that existed in scientific thought long
before any tools were invented to observe them. Maxwell’s main thesis is that
there can be no clear distinction between observation and theory:
The point I am making is that there is, in principle, a continu-
ous series [of observations] beginning with looking through a vac-
uum and containing these as members: looking through a window
pane, looking through glasses, looking through binoculars, looking
through a low-power microscope, looking through a high-power
microscope, etc., in the order given. The important consequence
is that, so far, we are left without criteria which would enable us
to draw a non-arbitrary line between “observation” and “theory”.
[Maxwell 1962, 7]
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By Maxwell’s reasoning, deciding that an observation through a micro-
scope is not an observation leads us to try and establish a reliable boundary
between observation and non-observation. Maxwell argues that trying to fix
this boundary at the point where tools like microscopes are used is a dead
end, because window panes and glasses are in some way tools too and nobody
would realistically claim that the observation of an object through glasses is
an indirect observation. His conclusion is that everything called observation in
science, is actually an observation. And that observability is changeable and
depends on the scientific tools and theories available at the time.
I conclude that our drawing of the observational-theoretical line at
any given point is an accident and a function of our physiological
make-up, our current state of knowledge, and the instruments we
happen to have available and, therefore, that it has no ontological
significance. [Maxwell 1962, 14–15]
To Maxwell, observation is more or less any reasonable inference that can
be made from experimental data or examined entities. This concept is based on
the obvious absence of a dividing line between observation and non-observation
(or theory). According to Maxwell, we are even able to observe the gravita-
tional field or it’s metric tensor Gµν “by sitting on a chair—and we do it
directly” [Maxwell 1962, 14]. To me the advantage of Maxwell’s concept is
that it is intuitive and carefully avoids the problem of theoryladen observation
and other epistemological inferences. It openly states that any observation
is laden by presupposed knowledge, whether scientific or knowledge of other
kinds. The problem of theoryladeness in science (i.e., that nature and result of
an observation depends on certain presupposed theories) is discussed elsewhere
[Hanson 1958], [Kuhn 1962], [Goodman 1978].
Possibly, one could say that theoryladeness is everywhere, and therefore
harmless. But Maxwell’s definition of observation stops being intuitive if enti-
ties are categorically unobservable in principle, like natural constants or pure
mathematical objects (e.g., virtual particles). And it seems to me that some
data from particle experiments that are called observations rely too heavily on
theory, for example jet-events on which I will comment in Section 3.
In Bas van Fraassen, we find a sceptic concerned by the breadth of the con-
cept “observable”. He does not deal with the distinction between direct and
indirect observation but tries to pin down the distinction between observable
and unobservable. This is quite simple, especially from an empiricist’s point
of view. Van Fraassen’s examples are archetypal—seeing a vapour trail in the
sky is not the same as observing a jet, but the unaided perception of the jet
itself is (we come back to this later). Similarly, the track of a particle is not
to be treated as an observation of the particle itself [van Fraassen 1980, 17].
Van Fraassen challenges Maxwell’s view and suggests a concept of observation
that is aware of its vagueness and its anthropocentric quality. The vagueness
follows, according to van Fraassen, from the fact that drawing the line be-
tween what is observable and what is only detectable is not possible without
Why Quarks Are Unobservable 171
arbitrariness in Maxwell’s sense [van Fraassen 1980, 16]. The anthropocentric
quality derives from the “able”-part in “observable”. If something is x-able,
someone has to have the ability to x. Van Fraassen asks further whether it is
possible for technical aids such as microscopes and telescopes to increase the
number of observable objects. Van Fraassen reasons:
This strikes me as a trick, a change in the subject of discus-
sion. I have a mortar and pestle made of copper and weighing
about a kilo. Should I call it breakable because a giant could
break it? Should I call the Empire State Building portable?
Is there no distinction between a portable and a console record
player? The human organism is, from the point of view of physics,
a certain kind of measuring apparatus. As such it has certain
inherent limitations (. . . ) It is these limitations to which the
“able” in “observable” refers—our limitations, qua human beings.
[van Fraassen 1980, 17]
Furthermore, van Fraassen disassociates the observable-question from ques-
tions about observable and unobservable objects. By ridding himself of the
need to find a line between observable and unobservable, van Fraassen is able
to discuss his specific view of scientific anti-realism without being hampered
by examples of new pretended observations in microphysics.
This survey—although a reliable alternative—has much in common with
Maxwell’s and so my suggestions run along similar lines as before. There
is, as argued above, no compelling arbitrariness in the demarcation, or any
necessary reason, to restrict observability to the unaided human eye. Van
Fraassen’s rejection of technical aids to observe events leads to a statement
like this:
A look through a telescope at the moons of Jupiter seems to me
a clear case of observation, since astronauts will no doubt be able
to see them as well from close up. [van Fraassen 1980, 16]
Thus, as to van Fraassen, the observable-label depends on the circum-
stances of the observation. While I fully agree with this opinion, his example
seems to be based on something still open to be demonstrated. Since nobody
so far has been close to the moons of Jupiter, all we know about their exis-
tence and observability is based on research done from a great distance with
the help of, e.g., optical means, namely telescopes. We have to discuss the
view through a telescope before we travel to the discovered objects (if such
journey will be undertaken at all). Van Fraassen seems implicitly to agree to
the existence of the moons as solid spheres orbiting Jupiter and, therefore, he
already uses a concept of observation being independent of astronauts facing
an object in front of them.
Finally, it must be pointed out that van Fraassen, based on his treatment
of “observation” and “observability”, would presumably deny the observability
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of quarks. For him, quarks would be a theoretical ingredient to make quark-
theory adequate to deal with such events. While I would agree that quarks are
unobservable, I come to that conclusion for different reasons.
Next on the list is Dudley Shapere. He investigates an experiment designed
to study the core of the sun by monitoring neutrinos from it with a subtle
apparatus placed deep underground [Shapere 1982]. The resulting data details
the frequency of each radioactive substance found in the apparatus. Originally,
the experiment was arranged to test a theory about atomic fusion in the sun’s
centre, something the data successfully confirmed. But Shapere was more
interested in deriving a concept of observation from the experiment. According
to him, the experiment was a direct observation of the core of the sun. This
direct observation was theoryladen, but the theoretical components could be
systematised and explained. He reasoned that for there to be an observation
situation there must be, in general, a flux of information from the observed
object to the observer. There has to be: (a) a theory about the observed
object that has to release some kind of physical signal as information; (b) a
theory about the transmission of this information that makes sure that the
information is not altered or tampered with; (c) a theory about the receptor
of that information which must not be a biological or even human receptor.
Any kind of measuring device can be taken as a receptor [Shapere 1982, 490ff.].
Shapere summarises:
x is directly observed (observable) if: (1) information is received
(can be received) by an appropriate receptor; and (2) that infor-
mation is (can be) transmitted directly, i.e., without interference,
to the receptor from the entity x (which is the source of the in-
formation). [Shapere 1982, 492]
He shows explicitly how, according to the theory of core fusion, the centre
of the sun emits neutrinos radiation in all directions, even in the direction of
the Earth. According to particle physics, most of the neutrinos pass the Earth
unaltered, but some interact with matter. Physics can predict the frequency
of interactions in a given amount of, say, perchloroethylene provided it is
placed underground to protect it from other cosmic rays. An interaction of
neutrinos with perchloroethylene produces a radioactive isotope which can be
counted. The theories about the sun, the flux of neutrinos, and the events in
perchloroethylene as well as in a device like a Geiger counter tell us, according
to Shapere, that there is information being reliably transmitted from the sun’s
core to us. Thus, we would be able to observe the sun’s core directly.
So far, this notion of direct observation is convincing and it has the ad-
vantage of making the search for a definition of indirect observation, obso-
lete. Nearly everything is directly observable if we only have enough physical
knowledge. Shapere excludes consciously the realm of quantum physics where
theories of the source and the transmission are not clearly separated. This
and other “special complexities and difficulties of interpretation” prevent the
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application of Shapere’s concept of direct observation to today’s elementary
particles [Shapere 1982, 512–513].
There is, however, another reason to abandon his proposal. In Shapere’s
view the same situation can be interpreted as a direct observation of several
different things. Counting the amount of radioactive decays in the Geiger
counter can be a direct observation of the centre of the sun, or of neutrinos
interacting with perchloroethylene, or of a radioactive substance, or simply
the Geiger counter sat in front of the scientist providing data. In that case,
the notion of observation once again broadens out to approach the views of
Maxwell, although it is restricted to entities capable of acting as a source of
information. To me, any reasoning on “observation” has to allow for directness,
indirectness and complete unobservability, even when considering entities that
are somehow hidden from view. The correct definition of “observation” should
help to decide if these objects exist due to direct or indirect observation or if
they will perpetually remain theoretical entities.
By now we should have some idea of how the protagonists of philosophy of
science deal with the problem of scientific observation and how these proposals
might be flawed. There are, of course, other proposals from Ian Hacking
and Paul Feyerabend to name a few, but they are less important to us since
their focus is slightly different from ours. For example, both Hacking and
Feyerabend treat observation as an ability of scientists, something one is able
to learn and improve upon [Hacking 1983, 180–181]; [Feyerabend 1978, 40–47].
They therefore are discussing the term “observation” from a different point of
view. My approach in direct comparison to Hacking and Feyerabend is asking:
What is the definition of “observation” independent of abilities and scientific
theories; what term of observation did we already develop when thinking about
learned scientists who seem to observe more than others?
Feyerabend, moreover, focuses on the theoryladeness of observation and
concludes pretty fast that every observation, even in everyday life, is theory-
laden. According to him, at least three theories are involved when we, e.g.,
observe a simple table: a theory of the human eye, a theory of light, and
a theory of the physiology of the whole observer. Even a table would be a
theoretical notion hence. Feyerabend believes that the dichotomy between ob-
servable and unobservable breaks down [Feyerabend 1978, 46]. I think this is
too broad a concept of theory. We reasonably discuss whether we observe a
simple table without any use and need for scientific theories. This fact goes to
show that observation (everyday and in scientific laboratories) does not have
to be theoryladen.
2.2 The approach to the problem of observation
Before fully entering the discussion, I want to develop two basic premises.
First, a definition of observation should be independent from all physical
knowledge. The meaning of “observation” should not be influenced by changes
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in physics. Observing something in science is an epistemological undertaking
that originates from an object’s observation in daily life. It neither depends
on contingent technical knowledge, nor on an exclusive ability possessed by
only a few. Therefore, I would like to argue in another way, as Ian Hacking
has done in Representing and Intervening [Hacking 1983, 180–181]. I think
that statements like “in former times observation was to do x but today, in the
era of quantum physics observation is to do y” or “an expert sees electrons in
a certain picture while a layman just sees light lines in the dark” (no quota-
tions!) fail to address the heart of the matter, although it must be emphasised
that physical insights can alter the realm of the entity being observed. (I will
return to this idea later when talking about telescopes and microscopes.)
My second premise is that a definition of observation should avoid meta-
phors. It is easy to classify something as observable, audible, sensible, calcu-
lable or whatever, if it is not meant literally. Surely we “observe” the law of
gravity while watching the curve of a stone thrown in the sky or we “observe”
the quantum physical property “spin” in a Stern-Gerlach experiment. Liter-
ally, though, we observe only the stone in the first example and a continuous
beam splitting in a (non-observed) non-homogeneous magnet field in the sec-
ond. This is unquestionably the case at least temporarily. Entities like gravity
and spin cannot be observed, only their effects. This is admittedly a com-
plete different path in comparison to Maxwell or Feyerabend. Furthermore,
if metaphors are used to describe experiments in microphysics, quote marks
should be used to alert the reader to the distinction.
Observation is always a kind of perception. But what criteria does a
perception have to fulfil to be classed as an observation of an object? Ev-
ery observation begins with the human senses. It may otherwise cause some
philosophers to quibble whether an automatic camera was actually observing
an object prior to a human being arriving and observing the photograph or the
stored film. (One can consider the observation accomplished since the pres-
ence of a human being changes nothing of how the object and its environment
are observed). However, since observation is related to human knowledge I
would prefer to exclude such debates and exclude Shapere’s approach at the
same time, too. Thus, the challenge to define “observation” is restricted to
what observation may be for a human being interested in empirical knowledge
about the external world.
Next I want to set the precondition that any object observed has to be
perceived as an independent, individual entity. Think of somebody delivering
a speech in front of an audience. The speaker watches the audience while
talking. The object observed is the group of hearers, and not the individual
hearers themselves. And it could happen that an old friend of the speaker
was in the audience, and surprises the speaker by saying hello to him privately
after the speech. At that point, the speaker is obviously observing his friend,
but it would be wrong to say that the speaker had previously observed his
friend while he was in the audience. Accepting the above distinction rids us of
several problems. It allows us to recognise that watching the moon is not the
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same as seeing each of its craters, or that observing a sugar cube is not the
same as observing its grains, molecules, atoms or electrons. Thus, it should
be noted that parts of a group may not be observable even if the whole group
is. In this way, some misleading arguments about the separation of direct and
indirect observation can be avoided from the start.
There are many everyday examples that illustrate the distinction between
direct and indirect observation. Take again an aeroplane in the sky. Sometimes
it is directly observable, sometimes we observe it indirectly because we see only
the vapour trail caused be the aeroplane. But what makes this distinction?
If the aeroplane is close enough we are able to distinguish it in space and
time, i.e., to separate it from other planes or other phenomena in the sky.
While there may be a lot of physical things between the aeroplane and our
perception, like air, light-waves and our eyes, epistemologically-speaking there
is nothing between the observing person and the aeroplane if the person can
see that plane. Moreover, we are able to identify some important properties
of the aeroplane—its colour, size or construction. It is without doubt directly
observed. By watching only the vapour trail of a plane, we can still gain some
information about an individual plane travelling through space and time. Since
the plane is beyond our human sensory reach, we do not observe the plane
directly, we only see the vapour, but relying on our personal knowledge or
experience of how vapour trails form, we can infer from the directly observed
vapour trail that we are indirectly observing an aeroplane. Other examples of
direct and indirect observation are fire and its smoke or a skier and his tracks
in the snow.
Indirect observation depends on causality and some understanding of the
origin of vapour trails, smoke, and ski tracks, fairly using the Humean concept
of causality. It therefore has to be described as a knowledge- or experienceladen
process. In science, indirect observation is, by analogy, theoryladen. Whereas
direct observation, whether in daily life or in science, is not.
The problem of theoryladeness (see Section 2.1) is not relevant here, since
it is strongly related to the experienceladeness of indirect observation in every-
day life, and in this instance experienceladeness does not stop us from making
reliable judgments. Remember the thoughts of Maxwell. We are, in contrast
to him, able to suggest both an observation/non-observation line and a di-
rect/indirect line for observations. These distinctions are neither arbitrary
nor a function of human physiological or psychological attributes because they
are dealing conceptually with the differences between directness and indirect-
ness. They would also allow most observations undertaken with scientific tools
to be described as direct observations.
The next problem is to separate a directly observed object from a mere
illusion. Sometimes, especially when new tools of observation are invented, it
is not clear whether the visible result is an object or just its image. The best
way to solve this dilemma is to do the same thing as we do in everyday life
to separate between object and illusion—we try to find out more about that
object, we need achieve broader acquaintance with it.
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If we are, say, on a street, and uncertain whether a car is real or just a
picture on an advertising hoarding, we change the angle of our view by moving
our head or taking a few steps to the side because we know from experience
that a 3D object will look different from a 2D image if our point of view
changes.
Now, what is important for us here is that a difference between the phe-
nomena is only gained by expanding our visual experience of the object in
question. From a distance, a single view of a real car may not differ from
a picture. Similarly, people who wear glasses are sometimes surprised by a
new object, say, laying in front of them on a table. Is it an object or just a
spot on the glasses? The answer is obvious when you turn your head. If the
object moves as your head turns, then it is a spot on the glasses. If it does
not move it must be an object independent of your movement and therefore
lying on the table. This is what I mean by broader acquaintance and when
observing an object. And this concept is inspired by preliminary thoughts of
Berkeley and Leibniz.1 This everyday epistemology may sound irrelevant to
the subtle methods of today’s physics but, at the end of this Section, I try to
show otherwise.
There is one last important point about the definition of observation. To
observe something directly you must observe the object individually, but an
indirect observation needs the viewer only to witness a physical phenomenon
caused by the hidden object. But what about the individuality of an indirectly
observed object? Think of a skier-track in the snow, a single one yet caused
and consolidated by a group of skiers. Considering this example I must empha-
sis that the individuality of an indirectly observed object must be preserved.
Otherwise we only indirectly observe a cluster of objects.
Our definition of direct and indirect observation is now complete. To
summarise:
– An object is directly observed if it is perceived as an individual entity
within broader acquaintance. The observation does not depend upon
physically-caused phenomenon. And the observation is not theoryladen,
although it can take place with the assistance of technical devices as
long (temporal) as individuality is preserved and broader acquaintance
remains possible.
– An object is indirectly observed if the physical phenomenon created by
the object is observed directly. The indirectly observed object has to
retain its individuality. And an indirect observation is always either the-
oryladen or experienceladen, whether it be in science or in everyday life.
This definition shows from my point of view some advantages over earlier
concepts: Maxwell was forced by his approach to deny a clear distinction be-
1. See Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision, sect. CIII ff., and his Principles of
Human Knowledge, sec. XVIII ff. [Berkley 1910]; and see Leibniz Nouveaux Essais,
4. book, chap. 11 [Leibniz 1966].
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tween observation and theory; he did not include something like our notion of
broader acquaintance in his discussion. Shapere’s proposal lacks of determina-
tion: the same situation can be interpreted as a direct observation of several
different things. It is once more the notion of broader acquaintance that en-
ables us to get rid of such underdetermination since if we make acquaintance
we make it only of one object at a time.
Van Fraassen alludes to the dependence of contingent human physiology
to pin down what observable is. With our definition of direct and indirect
observation, however, we are independent of human physiology as well as of
contingent technical progress. In addition to microscopes and telescopes, other
instruments could be invented without impairing the above definition.
To end this Section I would like to recount a few examples found in science.
A view through a telescope is a direct observation. By moving the telescope
to various places in the sky or on earth, we get a reasonable change in view.
In the same way, astronomical objects can be seen from different perspectives
in winter and in summer. A single glance does not confirm an observation
but repeated viewings over time do. This was crucial to Galileo’s discoveries
and this could held to be the main reason why Galileo’s critics got silent in
the long run. No understanding of the laws of optics or theoretical knowledge
of the functionality of telescopes is needed to recognise the event as a direct
observation.
Likewise, the view through a light-microscope is a direct observation.
Though the microscope itself cannot be moved, the object observed can be
with a pipette or other small tool. The moving of the pipette, seen in the
ocular, is logically associated with the movements of the viewer’s fingertips.
Anybody, even those unfamiliar with microscopes, can recognise cells and bac-
teria after a short period of experience and by expanding the context of the
situation. Night-vision goggles or glasses work in a similar way. But images of
atoms made by a scanning-tunnel microscope work differently however. They
rely on collecting single measured points in a grid pattern. Currently, the de-
vices for scanning the surface of a solid material on atomic scale are not fast
enough to result in an exact visual image, instead the results are an approxi-
mate 3D graphical image. It is similar to a picture. But even though we can
explore the context of the picture, it is not the same as getting into broader
acquaintance with pictured objects.
A conventional photograph is not a direct observation. It is an indirect
one. From our general knowledge of photography, we know that a picture
is typically shot in a certain place at a certain, very short time. Therefore,
the individuality of objects seen in the picture is preserved. In the same way,
the picture of particle tracks is a two-fold indirect observation. We never
see the particle, rather a photograph of the trail of the particle. Still, the
individuality of the particle is carried over to the picture. And we can, for
example, deduce the particle’s charge from studying the photograph. Particle
tracks, particularly in relation to these observations will be discussed in the
following Section.
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3 Quarks and jet-events
3.1 Jet-events in physics
Before applying our concept of observation to quarks, we need to review some
experimental methods in high energy physics. To investigate elementary par-
ticles you must use detectors to record particle tracks as a kind of photograph.
Particle detectors are basically a particle-sensitive material that interacts with
particles pointwise as they pass the detector. The points of interaction are col-
lected, listed, and graphically displayed in relation to their order in space and
time. The result: pictures of particle tracks, or to be exact, of rows of points
of interactions. The aim is to develop a particle detector sensitive enough,
that the rows are so dense that they look like continuous tracks to the naked
eye. Or so dense that a computer can calculate a continuous track as if the
particle was a tiny object, literally flying through the detector.
This model may not be consistent with some other aspects of quantum
physics, but it is still useful in determining some properties of particles. Par-
ticles identified in this way are typically electrically charged like electrons,
several mesons (on which I will comment soon), and protons. There are other
types of particle detectors such as for photons and neutrons, but they are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
Whatever particles like electrons are, it is fair to say that they are indirectly
observed when they make a particle track. One individual track belongs for
a short time to a single electron and by studying that track it is possible to
identify some of the electron’s permanent properties. The analogy of a skier’s
trail in the snow or a plane’s trail in the sky holds true, though we have
to accept that typical objects are directly observable in multiple situations
whereas particles are not. You can shake hands with a skier at the bottom of
a slope, but the closest you can get to an electron is its track. This might be
worth philosophical consideration another time, but right now it is important
to note that particle tracks are examples of indirect observation.
Now to quarks. The first thing to point out is that they cannot—in
theory—cause single particle tracks like electrons or protons, despite the fact
they are electrically charged. The physical explanation for this is based on
the strong nuclear force between quarks. This force binds quarks together in
quark-confinement. A phenomenon special to quarks that are thought to be
the basic components of protons, neutrons (nucleons, or three-quark-systems),
and mesons (two-quark-systems). Imagine the (slightly misleading) picture
that quarks are small balls, quark-confinement is like a rubber band that holds
them together and turns nucleons and mesons into stable particles. Trying to
separate quarks from each other, by for instance shooting them through a par-
ticle detector, only serves to increase the force between them. If you try to
split a bounded quark-system with energy it fails to break that rubber band.
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Under the rules of quantum theory an unstable system of two quarks with
a high level of energy converts to a system of four quarks with less energy. By
adding energy to quark systems you do not isolate single quarks, but produce
new ones that immediately combine to form two- or three-quark-systems. Al-
though the initial system breaks up, the result is a new system of bounded,
confined quarks. So quark-confinement stops any free, isolated quarks occur-
ring in particle detectors. Ironically, the only place where quarks can move
freely is inside the radius of its system that is bound by the energy force.
(For other introductions to quarks, the confinement, and jet-events see, e.g.,
[Pickering 1984], [Galison 1991].) Nevertheless, the properties of quarks can
be investigated either by probing a nucleus or by destroying it, and this is
where jet-events come in.
Making particles collide at high energy and either destroy them and/or
creating new particles is one way to test physical theories. Normally, collisions
cause particles to scatter in all directions from the point of collision. A picture
from a detector will show particle tracks spraying outwards from the point of
collision. But under certain circumstances—defined by the type of colliding
particles and their energy—a new kind of event can occur in particle detec-
tors. On these occasions particle tracks tend to be bundled into two, three
or four jets. The diagram below shows just such an event with two jets or
jet-branches.2
The centre of the picture is the point of initial scattering. What happens
there is, in theory, too small to detect. The events that occur take place on a
scale far smaller than the core of an atom. But all the lines from the centre
to the periphery of the diagram are particle tracks. In this example, they
seem to be bundled into two jets. Quark physics explains why this pattern
frequently occurs. The story goes as follows. When particles with high energy
meet, the provided system decays and produces new particles. In several cases
2. For other pictures of jet-events see [Duinker & Luckey 1980, 127, 136], [Söding
& Wolf 1981], [Banner et al. 1982], [Pickering 1984, 329].
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two quarks are created that fly off from each other in opposite directions.
To explain jet-events it is important to assume that quarks do exist as small
chunks and have a state of motion. Due to the strong force, quarks cannot keep
moving forward. When the deposited energy is great enough, the connection
between the quarks breaks and some energy forms two new quarks. Each of
the secondary quarks recombines with one of the primaries. Now we have
two mesons flying away from each other, still in opposite directions. They are
carrying too much energy to be stable and so decay into further particles—
electrons, low energy mesons, protons, neutrons, whatever. These are the
particles that reach the detector and make particle tracks. (Actually even
neutrinos and photons can be produced and particle detectors can also record
some particle’s velocity, energy, and charge. Such evaluations occur during jet-
event research too but shall not be part of this paper.) So, although nothing
is left of the initial quarks and their secondary mesons, the resultant tracks
indicate a common source and suggest that all particles are part of one of
the bundles, and both bundles form jets that move in opposite directions (as
shown in the diagram). It may be that particle tracks are ordered in this
way by chance, but jet-events occur more frequently than probability would
suggest. It makes sense that all particles are bundled into a branch of a jet-
event because they all come from a single meson which itself comes from a
single quark. So it seems plausible that the causal effects of an invisible object
can produce an observable phenomenon, and that the data from the particles
involved in an individual jet leads to the recognition of an individual quark.
And this would make jet-events, an example of indirect quark observation.
Yet by looking at the role jet-events actually play in high energy physics other
issues arise.
3.2 Physicists on jet-events
If you look at the main publications on jet-events, it was not the fact that
jet-events occur (and that they point to single quarks) that excited physicists,
but that an ensemble of jet-events was collected. For example, there is one
publication about the confirmation of the jet-model in a statistical counting
omitting any emphasis of a single jet-event [Hanson et al. 1975]. See also this
typical statement about jet-events:
We have observed that events with a large transverse energy (. . . )
have a dominant two-jet structure(. . . ) A sample of two-jet-events
has been studied and observed to feature properties characteristic
of hard scattering of partons. [Banner et al. 1982, 210]
No leading physical publication brought up the discovery of an individ-
ual jet-event or a single quark. The experimental evidence for the validity
of quantum chromodynamics in the context of jet-events consists mainly in
the measurement of values like “transverse momentum distribution”, “distribu-
tion of the Fox-Wolfram moment”, and certain cross-sections [Söding & Wolf
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1981, 265ff.]. This is crucial because it diminishes the value of single events
and enhances the value of them collectively. Therefore we have to reconsider,
whether an individual causation of a jet by a quark can be confirmed. More-
over, as mentioned in the introductory physical section, the reliability of a
single jet-event is not certain. A physical comment on three-jet-events where
one branch seems to stem from a radiated gluon instead of a third quark says:
The observation of three-jet-events in high energy e+e− annihila-
tion qualitatively confirms the prediction of hard gluon bremss-
trahlung by leading order QCD [i.e., quantum chromodynamics].
It does not, of course, rule out other mechanisms as possible
sources of these events. Therefore, detailed and quantitative tests
are called for. [Söding & Wolf 1981, 276]; the quotation contains a
reference to an acceding publication: [Preparata & Valenti 1981]
Hence, physicists argue quite careful when considering branches of jet-
events. As if they were aware that the branches do not necessarily have to
be produced by quarks. The power of the theory describing quarks—quantum
chromodynamics—depends upon accurate predictions of the frequency of jet-
events during numerous scattering events occurring under certain conditions.
Predicting the number of jet-events is based on our ability to separate jet-
events from other events. We need to acknowledge that jet-events do not have
to be as neat as in the diagram above. A reliable separation can be done by
computer programs [Duinker & Luckey 1980]. We must also remember that
events that look like jets but are not can occur statistically (and depending
on the quality of particle detectors) without any link to quark physics.
Taking another look at the seminal works on jet-events it continuously
seems that jet-events are always collected statistically. Results of experiments
do not depend on the qualitative discovery that jet-events exist, followed by an
investigation of the properties of a single jet-event and its branches. Although
results from single jet-events are collected, they are evaluated quantitatively.
The following comment makes this quite clear:
The observation of three-jet-events in high energy e+e− annihi-
lation into hadrons may be considered a major triumph of the
theory. QCD had predicted such events to occur as a result of
hard gluon bremsstrahlung. Close examination of the details of
the three-jet process at [the particle accelerator called] PETRA
shows consistency with QCD and comfirms the vector nature of
the gluon. From the rate of three-jet-events the events deter-
mine as = 0.17 ± 0.01 (stastistic) ± 0.03 (systematic) at
Q2 ≈ 1000 GeV 2. [Söding & Wolf 1981, 289]
In the literature we find only these typical statements. There is no publi-
cation among the leading jet-articles presenting a single jet-event as an obser-
vation-situation of one or more certain quarks.
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Figuring out what is actually a jet-event is a subtle process. The job falls to
particle physicists. But they must rely to some extent on epistemology because
it is not possible to single out an arbitrarily accurate jet-event from a jet branch
and say it is caused by a single quark. This constraint is not important for
quantum chromodynamics or the engineering of particle detectors. Quark
theory and quark experiments are today breathtakingly well established.3 To
me it seems that actually physics is not particularly interested in single jet-
events but philosophy is. This view is supported by the fact that several of
the initial publications on jet-events do not display jet-events at all [Hanson
et al. 1975]. Plenty of debates already exist on observation and quarks. These
arguments reference plenty of experiments but say little about jet-events. The
following comments make an interesting contrast to our discussion and deal
with quark-confinement and its limiting influence on our epistemological access
to quarks. Both appraisals come to the conclusion that quarks are indeed
observable.
3.3 The observability of quarks in Shrader-Frechette
and Massimi
Although Andrew Pickering does not address the question of the observability
of quarks in his monograph Constructing Quarks [Pickering 1984], other scien-
tific philosophers have discussed this topic. The first debate took place around
1982 and was initiated by an essay of Kristin Shrader-Frechette [Shrader-
Frechette 1982a]:
It is widely accepted that scattering data are a means of observ-
ing particles directly. The difficulty with quarks, of course, is that
they are not detected directly in any experiments, although parti-
cles said to be composed of quarks are directly “observed”. More
precisely, although effects of some particles are directly observed,
in scattering experiments quark effects are not directly observed
as quark effects, but are said to affect the behaviour of particles
which are directly observed. [Shrader-Frechette 1982a, 133–134]
Shrader-Frechette goes on to deal with experiments confirming the J/ψ-
meson (1974) and decays of charmed hadrons (ca. 1976). Quantum chromo-
dynamics contains six different types of quarks, including one called charm.
Charmed quarks are thought to be constituents of mesons or hadrons, provid-
ing them with special properties that other mesons or hadrons do not have.
Examples are the J/ψ (or charmonium) and charmed hadrons. Verifying these
particles would also verify quantum chromodynamics, if no other theoretical
explanation exists.
3. The signature of jet-events played a crucial role, among others, in the confirma-
tion of the sixth and heaviest quark, the top quark [Abe et al. 1994, 1995]; [Abachi
et al. 1995].
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Shrader-Frechette infers that charmed quarks actually have been observed
in tests on J/ψ-mesons and charmed hadrons. Of course, no single charmed
quark interacts with a particle detector—both charmoniums and hadrons be-
ing too short-lived to reach detecting devices—but they do cause certain decay
schemes which particle physics call detect. Shrader-Frechette points to an im-
portant difference between the J/ψ- and charmed hadrons. The decay pattern
of the charmonium can be explained without charmed quark involvement but
the decay of charmed hadrons cannot. This fact is related to the creation of
K-mesons seen in the decay pattern of charmed hadrons.
Although the “observation” of charmed particles was obviously
theory-laden (. . . ), this “observation” was not as theoretical, in
a potentially damaging sense, as that of charmonium. This is
because, while hypotheses other than charmonium could have
explained the J/ψ detection, there was no other known means
of accounting for the K meson. Thus, at least in this micro-
physical instance, observations of hadron decay provided a more
overt, a more direct means of observation of charm (. . . ) pre-
cisely because the theoretical context in which they occurred was
more unique and admitted of more specific predictions. [Shrader-
Frechette 1982a, 139]
Shrader-Frechette’s investigation draws its weight from the detailed anal-
ysis of background and alternative theories explaining the data of particle
scatterings. And it seems possible to distinguish between direct and indirect
observation albeit that theoryladeness is ever present. At least the last state-
ment of the quotation can be read this way. But in the end, the conclusion
that charmed quarks are observable either follows Shapere’s unsatisfying ideas
on observation or it is meant metaphorically and thereby allows for nearly any
interpretation. Shrader-Frechette ends with a little disclaiming summary:
It should not be surprising that our observations are understood
in a very abstract way, or that quark “observations” are quite dif-
ferent from everyday observations. [Shrader-Frechette 1982a, 141]
Participants of the ensuing debate—all printed in Synthese in 1982—depart
from quarks to consider the more general question of what scientific obser-
vation is [Albright 1982], [Shrader-Frechette 1982b], [Gruender 1982]. J. R.
Albright reasons that since a theoryladen observation needs a community of
members to agree on any presupposed knowledge, then observing is not dissim-
ilar to simply believing. Albright writes that a consensus is necessary in scien-
tific observation if the observation is to be thought reliable. This proposal—
touching on the territory of relativism—is criticised by Shrader-Frechette and
David Gruender and is too far removed from our discussion of the concept of
observation to warrant space here.
The observability of quarks concerns Michela Massimi, too [Massimi 2004].
Her start point is experimental realism. It is a position that originates from
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Ian Hacking, who opted for entity realism backed up by experimental sci-
entific methods. Hacking argues that since we are able to build devices that
emit electrons of a certain energy which have particular properties, those emis-
sions should be treated as part of our reality [Hacking 1982; 1983]. He puts
it like this: “If you can spray them, they exist.” Alternatively, if you can
use electrons as tools to probe other material, electrons must exist. Or if
they play a causal role in our model of microscopic events, they must exist
[Hacking 1982; 1983, 23, 36].
Massimi’s ideas combine Hacking’s realism and Shapere’s concept of obser-
vation and apply them to quarks. She particularly focuses on the experimental
context of scaling violation found in the measurement of structure functions of
nucleons. In this context the existence of quark physics and science’s present
model of nucleons is strongly confirmed. We do not have to go into the details
of structure functions, but her point is that a statistical collection of scattering
data results in a graphical curve—the structure function—that has a certain
property. It shows an inclination. Were there no inclination, then there would
be no relevance to quark theory. But the quantitatively-predicted value of
inclination of the curve, using the theory of coloured quarks inside nucleons
and exchanging gluons, was confirmed, and the structure of the nucleus can
be said to be physically understood.
While collecting scattering data, neither was the nuclei destroyed nor the
quarks isolated, but they were probed and manipulated. Thus, Massimi brings
Hacking into her argument:
“Seeing” quarks is not licensed by strong notion of manipulation
(spraying), but by a weaker notion of manipulation (probing) that
nonetheless still satisfies the engineering criterion of experimen-
tal realism (interfering/intervening). This way of “seeing” the
nucleon’s constituents presupposes a massive amount of theory.
[Massimi 2004, 49]
The Shapere-part of her proposal acknowledges that such observation (or
“observation”, as Massimi prefers to put it) is theoryladen and that our state
of knowledge changes our realm of observation:
I believe with Shapere that in certain cases what counts as “obser-
vation” depends ultimately upon our current state of knowledge;
and, most importantly for the rest of my argument, what kind of
entities physicists can arguably claim to “see” in a lab turns out
to be dependent on what kind of theory about these very same
entities they endorse. [Massimi 2004, 49]
Massimi interestingly allies Hacking’s experimental approach to
Shapere’s theory-focused concept of observability in quark physics, although
Hacking’s “if you can spray or manipulate them, they exist” raised suspicion
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in some people, and I am told it is a tautology. It is also possible that Mas-
simi’s concept of observation is nothing more than a metaphor for something
else. For our purposes though, it is evident that studying structure functions
represented as graphical curves on paper is neither a direct nor an indirect ob-
servation of quarks. Not that this effects our conclusion too much. Jet-events
seem to be more intuitive and better direct evidence for quarks than structure
functions could ever be.
My review of ideas on the observation problem generally (Maxwell, van
Fraassen, and Shapere) and more specifically in relation to quarks (Shrader-
Frechette, Massimi) has hopefully given you an insight into how deeply inter-
woven the discussion of observation and theoryladeness are. And how quickly
accepting the idea of theoryladeness leads to the statement that “observable is
anything”. Jet-events could provide a viable go-between.
4 The interpretation of jet-events
First, from our look at direct and indirect observation, it follows that in par-
ticle physics only indirect observation applies. This is not because elementary
particles are too small—many small things like cells and microbes are directly
observable and can be seen with the help of a microscope and our knowledge of
their context. But elementary particles withdraw from broader acquaintance.
It well may be that the principles of quantum physics provide the constraints.
Using indirect observation is nothing to worry about, many things in everyday
life as well as in science and high energy physics are only indirectly observable,
so we have no reason to exclude them from our ontology.
But the question remains are quarks indirectly observed in jet-events? To
answer it, we have to take a single branch of a jet-event and try glean as much
information from it as possible, just as we might if we took a single particle
track to learn about the particle’s charge-mass ratio, its energy and other
properties. Again, I do not see whether other experimental contexts come
closer to quarks than jet-events. As we have seen in Section 3.2, however,
physicists do not take a single jet-event to get information that is causally
linked with one or more distinct quarks. The criterion of indirect observation
given in Section 2.2, therefore, is not fulfilled.
You could argue that there is physical significance in looking at single jet-
events, and that it will make a nice task for a particle physicist sometime in
the future. Alternatively, you could reconsider the origin of a jet-event branch
in the quark physics model.
The indirectly observed particles that make tracks in a bundle, come from a
short-living meson. This meson does not cause a trail itself but every trail from
a jet-branch carries some properties of the original meson, like its electrical
charge. The sum of the electrical charge carried by the secondary particles
is equal to the charge of the initial meson. Although, such a meson is not
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observed directly in a jet-event, it can be identified by its charge that is carried
by secondary particles. The condition of indirect observation, i.e., observing
directly a physical phenomenon created by the object “meson” is fulfilled. The
directly observed phenomenon is particle tracks. In this way, it is possible to
say that the meson is indirectly observed. It is indirectly observed because
it is identified in a decay pattern that itself consists of indirectly observed
secondary particles.
Although the meson is thought to consist of two quarks, the quarks play no
part in the decision of whether the meson is indirectly observable. According
to the quark model, one of the quarks in the indirectly observed meson comes
from the very centre of the particle collision that causes the jet-event. However,
we cannot identify that individual quark by looking at the single jet-branch.
The electrical charge of a quark (which is always −1/3 or +2/3) is never
conserved in a jet-branch since all detectable particles carry a charge of +1,
−1 or zero. The distinction of whether the original particle was a quark or
an anti-quark is also lost. Such information is not derivable from one single
jet-branch. So, if indirect observation is meant literally, we do not observe
quarks indirectly in a single jet-event.
Obviously, images of jet-events give an idea of a good, working particle de-
tector but they are not crucial for the confirmation of theoretically-determined
measuring values. By comparison, think of the discovery of the positron by
Carl D. Anderson in 1932. In his publication, we see images of positron tracks.
Since these images show that a single track is caused by a single positron, they
were key to his claim that positrons are indirectly observable [Anderson 1932].
Getting even one image of a certain particle track means the discovery of
a positron by indirect observation. And the charge-mass ratio typical for a
positron can be determined by evaluating the curvature of that track. Re-
member our definition in Section 2.2. Anderson observed indirectly positrons
in the same way as we observe indirectly an aeroplane by watching a vapour
trail in the sky.
This type of investigation is impossible for quarks, although quark physics
and quantum chromodynamics is none the worse for this. That quarks cannot
be observed has little impact on the successful verification of the physical
entity “quarks”, if the term “entity” is understood in its most basic sense. Many
entities are not observable—forces, natural constants, fields, virtual particles,
resonance particles, as well as natural laws or terms of natural laws.
To end this investigation I would like to appraise the meaning of my con-
clusion. There is a strong consensus that some objects, which are not directly
observable, might be indirectly observable. There are additionally entities
that to us do not exist because, among other reasons, they are not indirectly
observable.
In the case of quarks, we have seen that they cannot be indirectly observed,
even in the comparatively evidential context of jet-events. This should be a
strong hint that quarks are in principle unobservable, although, this is not yet
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proved. This brings us to the debate of scientific realism. And the indications
are that quarks can only be treated as entities, similar to other unobservable
entities in science.4
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